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SCHUCKING OFF THE RIGHTS OF THE AGED:
CONGRESSIONAL AMBIVALENCE AND THE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1975
GEORGE

J.

ALEXANDER*

Peter Schuck's masterful article 7he Graying of Civil Rights Law'
has so articulately captured the legislative history of the Age Discrimination Act 2 and so aggressively provided an apology for it that his
work, whose focus is the exceptions embodied in that statute, serves as
both a natural target and focal point of this paper.
Discussing the exceptions that make an uninspired Act more
dreary is not the most exciting task. It is necessary, nonetheless, since
the exemptions crystallize the dearth of advantage provided by this
law. Not since the original Age Discrimination in Employment Act,34
in which Congress all but suggested mandatory retirement at age 65,
has Congress so well demonstrated its desire to pay political lip service
to the aged without providing them substantial benefit.
In its implementing regulations 5 to the Age Discrimination Act,
the then Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 6 expressed this
lip service philosophy very well, though presumably quite unintentionally. In describing the Act, the agency said that it did two things: It
prohibited discrimination and it permitted the use of certain age distinctions. 7 The use of age distinctions--that is discrimination based on
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law; J.D., University of
Pennsylania; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale. My thanks go to Tracy Rambo for her careful research assistance. I, not she, am responsible for the content of the article-especially the title.
1. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law.- The Age DiscriminationAct of 1975, 89 YALE
L.J. 27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schuck].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter referred to as the ADA or
the Act].
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976) amended 1978 [hereinafter referred to as the ADEA].
4. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as originally enacted, only protected persons age 40-65, thus freeing an employer from any liability for discriminatory actions once the
employee reached the maximum age. In 1978, the Act was amended to raise its coverage to age
70. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92
Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. III 1979)).
5. 45 C.F.R. § 90 (1980).
6. In 1979 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was disbanded and replaced
by the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services. Education
Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, §§ 201, 301, 509, 93 Stat. 668 (1979).
7. 45 C.F.R. § 90.1 (1980).
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age-is thus simultaneously prohibited and justified. To be sure, the
exemptions are more narrowly cast than the broad prohibition, but in
the end they threaten to swallow up the purported benefit at least as
Professor Schuck would interpret them.
SCHUCK'S OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF AGE AS A CRITERION

It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the wisdom of
prohibiting age discrimination in the manner in which racial discrimination, for example, is prohibited," but some of that discussion must be
reviewed to make what follows meaningful. Professor Schuck announces himself comfortable with distinctions based on age because he
believes the elderly to be less in need of legislative intervention than
more traditionally protected groups. He contends:
[The] distinctive characteristics of both age as a classificatory criterion and of the ADA as a hybrid form of legislation imply a relatively limited definition of age discrimination, a definition that in
turn implies an interpretation of the exception under which relatively
few existing uses of age are likely to be prohibited. 9
Schuck argues that since age distinctions are neither inherently discriminatory, nor historically suspect, the use of age as a classification
criterion is entirely reasonable. He reaches this conclusion after responding to his own arguments against the use of age as a criterion, a
brief summary of which is in order.
Schuck's first objection to the use of an age criterion is that it
"classifies individuals on the basis of a characteristic that is immanent
and inescapable to them, one suggestive of neither culpability nor demerit."' 0 His answer to this objection is that since, presumably, we all
will experience being a particular age, "members of other age groups
are surely less likely to use age rules to oppress persons whose status
8. I am flattered that, in his response to this article, Schuck, Age DiscriminationRevisited, 57
CHI. KENT L. REV. 1029 (1981) (printed below) [hereinafter cited as Schuck Revisitedl, Professor

Schuck ignores my disclaimer and continually insists on further documentation of a position that
was merely outlined as background. Although the invitation is inviting, this is not the time to
accept it.
Nonetheless, lest one perceive the disagreement between Professor Schuck and myself as not
being fundamental to the issue of age discrimination, one should consult the Schuck Solution.
Professor Schuck would deal with age discrimination by having Congress enact a rational relationship test. See Schuck Revisited, supra. That test has, of course, been traditionally applied in
equal protection cases without the need for legislation. The Supreme Court has interpreted it to
legitimate almost any kind of governmental action. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Pilots Comm'n, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
9. Schuck, supra note 1, at 75-76.
10. Id. at 32-33.
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they have shared or expect to share." " Furthermore, "using an immanent, impersonal characteristic such as age to determine one's entitlement to benefits is less stigmatizing or damaging than doing so on the
basis of a characteristic, such as maturity or employability, that reflects
directly upon one's personal merit."' 2 Compare this to the Report of
the House of Representatives:
Non-involvement of older persons is traceable time and again,
not to their own desires, but to a determination by the leaders of
many institutions in our society to discriminate against persons as
workers and as volunteers solely because they have reached a given
age. They refuse to consider the merits of each case. In so doing
they reflect by their deeds a deep-seated prejudice against the elderly.
Prejudices against the aged are reflected also in society's unwillwe believe other age
ingness to provide them with services which
13
groups are entitled to as a matter of right.
Professor Schuck's arguments seem to slight a number of problems
unique to aging. Perhaps, the most significant is that/ the prejudice
against the elderly is psychologically deep-seated. The fact that we all
age aggravates rather than softens this prejudice. Our youth culture
brings with it a commitment to deny aging. As a culture, we dress
youthfully; we simulate youth with cosmetics; we endearingly refer to
each other as "baby." The list is endless. Apparently, the elderly are
an affront to our pretenses of youth. They are what we deny we are
becoming. The fact is that classifications not based on personal merit
tend to heighten, not lessen, the stigma associated with advanced age.
This stigma arises from misguided concepts of aging itself which invoke feelings of powerlessness in the elderly. As one writer stated:
Aging, in the words of one student of community medicine, is commonly viewed as a biological process, "something that happens to us.
Old age is a disease, biology robs us, and death is the ultimate mugger." Viewed from this vantage, the individual emerges as apassive
victim of impersonalforces. In truth, however, the individual is also
the victim of our--and his--expectations. Over the course of a lifetime, the individual learns how an aged person "ought" to behave,
and this, together with the very widespread social reinforcement,
contributes to his adopting that role, incapacities and all. And the
rest of us, afflicted with the natural tendency to see what we expect to
difficulty
see and disregard much of the remainder, usually have little
14
in finding examples to confirm our pre-existing views.
11. Id. at 33.
12. Id. at 33-34 (footnote omitted).

13. H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
14. Halper, Paternalismand the Elderly, in AGING AND THE ELDERLY 321, 325 (1978) (foot-

note omitted) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Halper].
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On another level, status in our society is significantly related to
employment. The elderly, often involuntarily unemployed, have lost
this status as well. Held captive in a classification he cannot alter, the
individual is made to realize the confines of his own powerlessness.
The older he gets, the narrower the space in which he may exercise his
freedom. As another commentator notes:
[T]he time in an American's life when he is least likely to be unemployed is the decade spanning the years of age twenty-five to thirtyfour. From that point on the likelihood of being unemployed leaps
at an astonishing rate-by sixteen percent for those aged thirty-five
to forty-four, by one hundred and twenty-three percent for those
aged forty-five to fifty-four, and by two hundred and seventy-three
percent for those aged fifty-five to sixty-four. Although the specific
percentages are, of course different, the same trend is observable in
government poverty statistics: the older one grows from the same
aseline of twenty-five to thirty-four years of age, the greater becomes the likelihood that one will be living in an officially defined
state of poverty; indeed, among unrelated individuals residing in urban areas those aged just forty-five to fifty-four are more than twice
as likely to be impoverished as those aged twenty-five to thirtyfour. 15
McDougal, Lasswell and Chen evoke another image:
Age-based compulsory retirement tends to precipitate or accentuate
the syndromes of aging, generating many value deprivations that
could otherwise be avoided or mitigated ....
The shock of compulsory retirement may be so overwhelming as
to generate a lasting state of anxiety and even depression. The ordinary process of aging aside, the psychosomatic condition of the elderly may be brutally and unduly impaired and exacerbated by the
shock of involuntary retirement. Formerly useful skills are consigned to the scrap heap overnight. Access to the accustomed flow of
information and other sources of enlightenment are lost or substantially reduced. While the power to vote may continue unaffected,
eligibility for office-holding, with minor exceptions, is denied. This
implies a concomitant decline in influence upon the making of effective community decisions and a sharpeningsense of powerlessness.
Condemning the elderly to "an idleness that hastens their decline,"
age-based involuntary retirement tends to affect all personal relations
and to evoke "the sorrow 16of parting, the feeling of abandonment,
solitude, and uselessness."'
Courts add to the stigma by providing their own stereotyping. For
example, observe the following description of the elderly discussed in a
15. Stannard, Growing Up and Growing Old" Dilemmas ofAging in Bureaucratic America, in
AGING AND THE ELDERLY 9, 17 (1978).

16. McDougal, LasswelL & Chen, The Human Rights ofthe Aged" An Application of the General Norm of Nondiscrimination, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 639, 641-42 (1976) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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dissenting opinion in Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc. :17
[A] restriction barring the residency of children under 12 [is not] unreasonable, for example, in an elderly retirement community or condominium. Nature itself biologically provides that only younger
adults can procreate. It is axiomatic that catabolism in the old results
in physical and mental frailties which render them not only incapable of reproduction, but also incompetent to withstand the rough,
tumble and noise of rampaging youngsters-inevitable accompaniments to the normal rearing of young children. For this very reason,
kids are commonly barred from hospitals. Sick people need peace
and quiet and so do old people who lose their erstwhile resilience to
turmoil and commotion. Indeed, tranquility is a must for the mental
health of older people.' 8
Such stereotypes help to cast aging as an illness, and the elderly as the
afflicted. Discrimination against the aged appears quite similar to gender based discrimination. It can be said of both that they do not afflict
a group underrepresented in the society. The primary press of societal
disadvantage comes from the persistence of stereotypes which restrict
autonomy. Women, for example, were long bound by the perception
that their function was familial, their business acumen slight and their
bodies frail. As is true with aging, none of these assumptions were
wholly unwarranted. Nonetheless, women have successfully sued to be
treated as individuals, to be judged for their own capacities and to be
given opportunities related to their specific ability. The principal rationale of U.S. Supreme Court invalidation of gender based discrimination cases has decried reliance on stereotypical positions concerning
women. Statutes preferring men to women for appointment as administrators of estates are held unconstitutional not because it is likely that
women will have had property management experience comparable to
men, but because the stereotype that suggests that they will not is offensive to the equal protection provision of the Constitution. 19
17. 358 So.2d 1084 (Fla. App. 1977).
18. Id. at 1091 (Letts, J., dissenting).
19. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Professor Schuck apparently disagrees. He points

out, quite correctly, that the stigma and disadvantage are not isomorphic and illustrates his point
by noting "American Jews, for example, are often stigmatized but are not, in conventional terms, a
disadvantaged group. American women are often disadvantaged but are not, again in conventional terms, stigmatized." Schuck Revisited, supra note 8, at 1032. He faults the paucity of my
authority for my position that the aged are disadvantaged. Better to understand this point of view,
I have conducted a brief and informal empirical study among my Jewish and feminist friends to
see whether his illustration is more illuminating to them than it has been to me. I regret to report,
they have been of no help. Perhaps Professor Schuck has some authority for his proposition
concerning women and Jews.
One would hope that Professor Schuck's demonstration that the aged are not disadvantaged
since they enjoy legislative success would not be accepted as an indication of lack of disadvantage
for other groups. Racial minorities would lose their status with the Civil Rights Acts, as would
women, but then, Professor Schuck believes them not disadvantaged.
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in MassachusettsBoard of Retirement v. Murgia 20 chose to distinguish the constitutional protection
afforded the aged from that afforded women. Nonetheless, whatever
the ultimate interpretation of the equal protection clause might be, the
stigmatizing effect upon both groups appears to be the principal reason
for rejecting Schuck's notion that age discrimination is acceptable as a
societal policy.
One must reject Professor Schuck's assertion that the argument
against age discrimination is based simply on a claim for a greater portion of public resources. Rather, it seems that the principal claim is
simply to individualize treatment and to avoid group discrimination.
Individualized programs may be no more beneficial to the elderly than
is present law and nothing in anti-discrimination policy necessarily requires affirmative compensation. Indeed, as indicated by one writer,
affirmative steps may be counterproductive:
The adoption of Social Security, for instance, was greeted as a great
boon to the elderly, and yet it is obvious by now that its blessings
have been very mixed. For the assertion of a governmental responsibility to provide for the aged would seem to have permitted the loosening of the bonds of family responsibility and thereby made it easier
for persons to neglect their debts to their elderly relatives. It is not
quite so hard to shunt them aside, after all, when one believes that
the government will take care of them. In addition to hastening the
elderly's isolation from their family, Social Security also has encouraged their withdrawal from the economy, for the law severely
limits the income that can be earned without incurring a reduction in
benefits. . . . It is the old story of government beginning by2 doing
things for the individual and ending by doing things to him. '
As another example, it is general knowledge that gradual physical
deterioration to varying degrees accompanies the aging process. Yet,
the age at which one becomes disabled, if one ever does, is not uniform.
However, for the purposes of veterans' benefits, Congress has determined that "a person shall be considered to be permanently and totally
disabled if such person is sixty-five years of age or older .... -22
Thus, the generalization now has the force of law.
A further instance of legislative stereotyping concerns the commonly recognized generalization that wage-earning capacity decreases
20. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
21. Halper, supra note 14, at 324.
22. 38 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1976). Professor Schuck claims not to understand how a statute that
provides "benefit" to the elderly can be an instance of discrimination. Schuck Revisited, supra
note 8, at 1039. The point has not, however, escaped the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Wengler v.
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980).

RIGHTS OF THE AGED

as age increases. Congress gave this generalization the force of law in
legislation dealing with disability payments which provided:
The Secretary, on review under Section 8128 of this title and after a
disabled employee becomes 70 years of age and his wage-earning
capacity would probably have decreased because of old age aside
from and independently of the effects of the injury, may recompute
prospectively the monetary compensation payable for disability on
the basis of an assumed monthly pay
corresponding to the probable
2
decreased wage-earning capacity.
Guardianship laws are a particularly common repository of age
stereotyping:
[Tiwenty-four of the fifty-one [urisdictions] refer directly to old age
or age-related conditions as grounds for guardianship. None excludes old age as a possible cause, and all are so worded as to permit
logical extrapolation to the elderly.
Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan,
North Carolina, and Utah refer to "old age;" Delaware, D.C., Kansas, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, and Wyoming to "advanced age." Nebraska and Nevada cite "extreme old age," and Arkansas, Florida,
Iowa, Missouri, and Washington refer to "senility." Pennsylvania restricts definition to "mental infirmities of old age," while Indiana includes both "old age" and "senility." New York's statute refers more
generally to "age" as a precipitant of incompetence; Alaska provides
for guardianship of "insane persons"
including "senile changes" in
24
its definition of mental illness.
When stereotypes are employed, discrimination necessarily results.
As Representative Solarz stated in the House debate on the original
ADA: "Clearly, there is no more room for discrimination on the basis
of age than there is for religious, racial, sexual or ethnic discrimina25
tion."
23. 5 U.S.C. § 8113(b) (1970). This section was deleted by Pub. L. No. 93-416, § 8, 88 Stat.
1143 (1974).
24. Parmelee, Protective Services For the Elderly." Do We Deal Competently With Incompetence?, 2 LAW & POL'Y Q. 397, 403, 416 n.4 (1980). Professor Schuck provides a particularly
dramatic illustration of the impact of societal stereotyping when he claims not to understand the
significance of the use of age as a factor in conservatorship and guardianship. Schuck Revisited,

supra note 8, at 1039-40. The legal issue in both conservatorship and guardianship is the potential
ward's ability to function. That issue can be directly addressed. To address it as a function of age
simply provides courts an easy excuse for age discrimination. See Alexander, Premature Probate:
A Different Perspective on Guardianshipfor the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1003, 1009 (1979). Cali-

fornia probate was changed to avoid that problem. Id. at 1008 n.21.
25. 121 CONG. REC. 9231 (1975). Professor Schuck apparently fails to understand that denying discrimination on the grounds of age necessarily leads to individuation. Schuck Revisited,
supra note 8, at 1037. Also, he confuses a general prohibition against discrimination with the
necessity of universal individuation. The Supreme Court has found it possible to approve a variety of affirmative action programs for racial minorities despite its previously universal refusal to
accept defenses in cases of intentional racial discrimination. University of California Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Fulilove v.
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Although it was enacted in 1975, the Age Discrimination Act was
not implemented until June 12, 1979, when HEW issued general
governmentwide regulations. 26 The ADA requires that regulations
consistent with those established by HEW be issued by "each Federal
department or agency which extends Federal financial assistance to any
program or activity by way of grant, entitlement, loan or contract other
than a contract of insurance or guaranty. ' 27 To date, full implementa28
tion has yet to be achieved.
EXEMPTIONS: WHERE AGE DISTINCTIONS ARE
PERMITTED UNDER THE

ADA

The "Any Law" Provision
Although the purpose of the ADA is to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of age, the Act excludes from its coverage certain practices
relating to employment 29 and certain programs and activities established "under authority of any Law." It is the "any law" exclusion
which raises the more significant legal issues. The Act provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any program or activity established under authority of any law which A provides any
benefits or assistance to persons based upon the age of such persons;
or (B) establishes criteria for participation in age-related terms
or
30
describes intended beneficiaries or target groups in such terms.
The meaning given to the phrase "any law" is crucial in applying this
exclusion for the definition of this phrase determines, to a large degree,
the scope of the Act itself. Yet, the importance of precisely defining
these phrases seemingly escaped both the House and Senate for the
legislative history on this point is exceedingly scarce.
The main references to the "any law" exclusion are found in the
Conference Report accompanying the 1975 bill which was adopted and
signed into law and in comments accompanying a proposed amendment which passed the House, but ultimately failed of enactment, in
1978. The Conference Report to the 1975 House Bill provides:
In section 304(b)(2), the language of the House bill excluded from
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Fundamentally, Professor Schuck would prefer to have an Act
addressed to specific instances in which a high level of social repugnancy has demonstrably created disadvantage for the elderly. We disagree.
26. 45 C.F.R. § 90 (1980).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(4) (1976).
28. See generally, Marlin,Enforcement of the Age DiscriminationAct of 1975, 57 CHI. KENT
L. REV. 1049 (1981).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(c) (1976).
30. Id. § 6103(b)(3).
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coverage of this title programs for which the law provides benefits to
persons based on such person's age, such as with Social Security.
The conferees have expanded this concept so as to exclude, as well,
programs for which the law describes intended beneficiaries or target
groups m age-related terms without reference to specific chronological age, as in the use3 1of such terms as "older Americans," or "elderly," or "children."
Yet, it is clear that this piece of legislative history simply does not
greatly aid in defining the phrase "any law" except to imply the obvious conclusion that federal law, for example Social Security, is at least
a part of the "any law" provision.
The 1978 House amendments would have clarified the "any law"
provision by amending it to read:
It shall not be a violation of this title, or of any regulation issued
under this title, for any person to take any action otherwise prohibited by the provisions of section 303 if, and to the extent that, such
action is specifically directed or provided by the terms of a Federal
statute, relating to the program or activity involved, which
(A) provides any benefits or assistance to persons based on the age of
such persons; or (B) establishes criteria for participation in age-related terms32or describes intended beneficiaries or target groups in
such terms.
Comments to this amendment reflect that the purpose of this change
was to "[cilarify the fact that the Age Discrimination Act in banning
'unreasonable discrimination' in federally assisted programs bans all
age based discrimination except that contained in Federal statute[s]. 33
This amendment was deleted in conference; 34 it does not follow, of
course, that the deletion established the converse of the excised provision.
It is of great significance that the 1978 amendments to the ADA
deleted the term "unreasonable" from the Act's statement of purpose
"in recognition of the fact that discrimination, by definition, is unreasonable. ' 35 Thus, it may be argued that the deletion of the word "unreasonable" served the same end as the proposed House amendment.
As Representative Pepper stated:
One ADA amendment not approved by the conferees . ..would
[Blut, I
have tightened the allowable exemptions to the act . . .
believe that the deletion of the word "unreasonable" from the act's
statement of purpose gives a good indication of how Congress in31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

H.R. REP. No. 670, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1975).
124 CONG. REc. H3924 (daily ed. May 15, 1978).
Id. at H3930.
See H.R. REp. No. 1618, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1978).
124 CONG. REC. H11451 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978).
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tends the existing exemptions to be interpreted. The ADA must be
viewed as a civil rights
statute. As such, exceptions to it must be
36
narrowly construed.
The question, then, still remains as to the definition of "any law." In
the absence of evidence of congressional intent, may it be assumed that
the Act was subordinated to state and local law?
Contrary to the approach taken by HEW in its regulations, it
seems appropriate to construe the "any law" exclusion so as to limit its
application to federal statutes. State and local laws which employ age
distinctions could still be justified, if their merit warrants, under one of
the Act's other exceptions.
While these exceptions have problems of their own, at least each
exception is more limited than the blanket provision excluding all age
based criteria from review because of their inclusion in state law. Even
at a time in which federal policy appears determined to return control
to the states, broader interpretation of the "any law" provision seems
an anomaly as it establishes the right of states to contravene federal
policy with federal funds. For example, if a federal act providing funds
for low income housing left most discretionary decisions to the state,
and the state established as a criterion to the use of the funds that recipients be under the age of 65, the "any law" provision would validate the
state's discrimination. Federal funds would effectively be barred to the
aged. Of course such abuses can be controlled in the provisions granting benefits, but the apparent purpose of the Age Discrimination Act
was to provide a generic prohibition against age discrimination that
would make individual act-by-act attention unnecessary. The foregoing example is extreme. However, even where state policy is less in
conflict with the apparent federal policy, the ability to superimpose
state perceptions of appropriate treatment of the aged on federal laws
provides the specter of subtle state interference.
The only case to date testing the "any law" provision involved a
federal statute which seems inevitably to require use of age-based criteria as it relates to retirement policy. In Seanor v. United States,3 7 the
plaintiff complained of a five percent reduction in his civil service annuity under provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act. The Act
required a reduction of benefits for those retiring under the age of 60.
Reviewing the age discrimination claim, the court of claims suggested
that it was "absurd." Undoubtedly, Seanor is a good example of the
type of law the exemption was understood to govern. Retirement bene36. Id.
37. Slip op. May 30, 1980 (Ct. C1.).
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fits for those who choose to retire when they are younger should probably reflect the anticipated longer duration of payments by appropriate
scaling down of periodic benefits. That is a far cry, however, from the
type of age-based provisions the states might enact given the broad imprimatur of the "any law" exception.
The "Normal Operation" Provision
The normal operation provision of title 42 provides in part:
It shall not be a violation of any provision of this chapter, or of any
regulation issued under this chapter, for any person to take any action otherwise prohibited by [this Act] if, in the program or activity
involved-(A) such action reasonably takes into account age as a
to the normal operation . . . of such program or
factor necessary
38
activity.
Schuck notes that there is only one instance in the Act's legislative history where this provision is mentioned and this is "in the conference
report, which simply quoted the exceptions, noting that they modify the
prohibition of discrimination 'by considerations of unreasonableness.'"39 However, Schuck argues, "We need not guess at its genesis
. . .for it closely parallels the language of the 'bona fide occupation
4
qualifications' (bfoq) exceptions in the ADEA and Title VII."
Schuck examines the two exceptions and ultimately concludes that the
ADA exception should be more broadly construed than that of the
ADEA. Yet, the opposite conclusion seems to be the more logical
choice.
First, the very wording of the ADA exception is more prohibitive
than that of the ADEA. The bfoq exception to the ADEA provides
that the qualifications must be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" 4 ' of the particular business while the ADA exception provides
that the activity in question "reasonably takes into account age as a
factor necessary to the normal operation" 42 of the program or activity.
Thus, under the ADA exception, a more rigid standard is set-age
must be necessary to the normal operation, not reasonablynecessary as
under the ADEA. Schuck acknowledges that such textual disparities
may justify different interpretations of these two exceptions and admits
that such disparities imply "a narrower ambit for the ADA exception
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A) (1976).
Schuck, supra note 1, at 66 n.200.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1975).
42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A) (1976).
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than for the bfoq exceptions. ' 43 In fact, he presents no argument based
upon this textual difference favoring a broader scope for the application of the ADA exception than for that of the bfoq.
Second, Schuck argues that the phrase "normal operation" is generally more difficult to define "in the context of federally assisted programs than in the context of businesses covered by the ADEA." 44 This
is so because the purposes of the federal programs are often ill-defined,
ambiguous, and undergoing change within the political environment.
In contrast, the normal operation of a business, especially in the context
of considerations of safety, may be adduced through readily obtainable
and objective data. Yet, it is unclear just how this factor militates in
favor of broadly construing the ADA exception. The difference between the ADA and the ADEA, between federal programs and businesses, recognized here raises the logical implication that the ADA
exception will be invoked with less frequency than the bfoq exception.
Certainly, the harder it is to define the normal operation of a federally
assisted program, the more difficult it will be to provide the requisite
evidentiary justification that an age distinction is necessary to this evasive "normal operation."
Third, Schuck argues that programs under the ADA, because they
are financed with public funds, are more concerned with the equal
treatment of individuals than are private employers. 45 He assumes that
separate and different treatment of some age groups may be necessary
in order to insure that they are treated equally and that rules employing
age distinctions may be required to insure against the risk of unfairness. However, implicit in his assumption is the presumption that the
particular needs of an individual may be determined by reference to
the general needs of those sharing his same age classification. This presumption, though perhaps not totally lacking in merit, assumes too
much for it serves only to reinforce age stereotypes while it de-emphasizes the needs of the individual. It serves to achieve exactly what the
ADA was enacted to prohibit.
Finally, Schuck observes the difference in economic incentives between private employers and operators of federally assisted programs.4
He argues, in essence, that a private employer has a greater incentive to
discriminate against particular age groups than does a program administrator. These observations may be correct, but they remain correct
43. Schuck, supra note 1,at 66 n.202.
44. Id. at 68.
45. Id. at 69.

46. Id. at 70.
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only so long as the political process remains relatively favorable to the
elderly. Public decision making is as subject to the marketplace of
political ideas for its survival as is private decision making for its
financial objectives. If pressure for funding of programs for the young
becomes politically irresistable, one should anticipate that public programs will attempt to find ways to divert funds to accomplish this objective from other available sources including the funds intended for
the aging.
The exemption speaks expressly of necessary conditions. That
would seem to suggest that a provision must be demonstrably unavoidable to qualify. So interpreted, aging would, for example, be a proper
consideration in insurance and annuity provisions and perhaps in retirement compensation schemes. It would not be an appropriate condition in those instances in which individual functional tests might
47
substitute.
The "Statutory Objective" Exception
Without explaining their actions, the conference committee that
structured the ADA added to the "normal operation" exception a further provision excluding what would otherwise be a prohibited discriminatory action if such action "reasonably takes into account age as a
factor necessary to. . . the achievement of any statutory objective" of
the program or activity involved. 48 The committee noted only that the
provision was included to "clarify congressional intent" 49 but did not
disclose the exact nature of this intent.
Schuck contends that the statutory objective exception is to be construed broadly. As support for this conclusion, he relies on the unofficial history of the Act and on a comment made by Representative
Quie. 50 The Act's unofficial history, Schuck asserts, reveals that HEW
informally urged the conference committee staff to insert this exception
"in order to mitigate the potential rigor and narrowness of the normal
operation exception." 5 ' HEW believed the normal operation exception
47. Professor Schuck continues to insist that I would require individuation in all cases despite
statements such as those I have just made. He is, of course, correct in pointing out that individua-

tion is almost always possible and, therefore, the use of age classification is never strictly necessary. The Supreme Court may be somewhat more liberal with the notion of necessity for some
governmental action perceived to be beneficial University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (racial factors in admissions necessary for class diversity).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(l)(A) (1976).
49. H.R. REP. No. 670, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1975).
50. See Schuck, supra note 1, at 73 & n.230.
51. Id. at 73.
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alone would not legitimize the solution administrators frequently adopt
because of budget constraints which target resources on particular age
groups. Representative Quie commented on the permissible use of agebased classifications in such a situation:
Thus, in a bill providing grants for the improvement of reading in
the elementary grades, but for which a relatively small sum had been
appropriated, the decision could be made to concentrate the effort on
the first three grades even though this discriminates against older
children. The basis of the decision would5 be
2 that otherwise the objective of the program would be defeated.
The conclusion that Schuck draws from the foregoing statement is
decidedly incorrect. He asserts that the exception was written with the
intent to permit administrators to employ age distinctions based on
cost-benefit analysis in order to expend scarce resources on groups most
likely to maximize the program benefits, even though this frequently
serves to exclude the elderly (because of their lower life expectancy)
from participation. He incorrectly states that "[c]ertainly, no contrary
53
intent appears in the legislative history."
The intent expressed in the legislative history of the ADA makes it
clear that cost-benefit analysis is not to provide the basis for age discrimination. Illustrative of this intent is Representative Pepper's comments on the 1978 Amendments:
The ADA must be viewed as a civil rights statute. As such, exceptions to it must be narrowly construed. I am particularly concerned
with certain excuses for not serving older people put forth by program managers interviewed by the Civil Rights Commission in preparing its report. They include the so-called cost-effectiveness
argument, which asserts that, since it is often more expensive to reach
older clients, a program could reasonably conclude that it could concentrate on younger persons. Other managers argue that the existence of age-specific programs, such as the community service
employment program for older Americans, justifies other, more general programs, such as those funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, ignoring the needs of older applicants.
[But] these excuses are nothing more than that. The deletion of the
word "reasonable" from the [Act's] statement of purpose makes that
discriminatory. They will beprohibitedunder
clear. Such practicesare
54
the new amendments.
In addition to this statement of legislative intent, comments made by
HEW in a discussion of the critical issues arising under the Act and its
regulations affirm that the statutory objective exception is not to be cir52.

121 CONG. REc. 37,299 (1975).

53. Schuck, supra note 1, at 75.
54. 124 CONG. REc. H 11,451 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978) (emphasis added).
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cumscribed by cost-effective analysis: "[C]ost-benefit consideration by
itself cannot be the sole justification for an exception under" the normal operation or statutory objective clauses. 55 Furthermore, HEW
makes it explicit that the statutory objective exception is to be narrowly
construed:
Because legislative history is a broad concept and because statutory
objectives will be used to justify the use of administratively imposed
age distinctions or factors other than age which have a disproportionshould
ate effect, HEW believes that the term "statutory objective"
be construed to mean only expressly stated objectives.56
Schuck advocates that the courts should not hesitate to overturn
HEW's interpretation. Such an interpretation, he claims, refuses to recognize an objective that is implicit in a statutory provision as well as
one which is implicit or explicit in its legislative history.57 For these
reasons, he concludes that the scope of the exception is unreasonably
narrowed by HEW's construction. Unless it is narrowly construed,
however, the statutory objective exception could, by itself, render the
ADA's prohibition against age discrimination virtually meaningless.
Contrary to Schuck's opinion, this prohibition was not simply intended
to eliminate arbitrariness in the competition among groups for scarce
resources but was meant to eliminate age discrimination regardless of
that competition. This point is further evidenced in the language used
in the House Proposed Amendment to the statutory objective exception
section of the ADA:
It shall not be a violation of this title, or of any regulation issued
under this title, for any person to take any action otherwise prohibited by section 303 if, in the program or activity involved, such action
is taken to remove barriers to participation in such program or activity by persons of a particular age. 58
Under a broad interpretation of the exception, program administrators would be free to imply, from the governing statute, any objective necessary in order to justify or authorize their use of age
classification. Legislative history could easily be molded by a skillful
interpreter to form the basis of any objective the program manager currently desired. Congressional intent, especially the intent to end age
discrimination expressed in the ADA, would become a pawn in the
administrative quest for an evasive statutory objective. It is neither un55. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,774 (1979) (supplementary information to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90).

56. Id. at 33,773.
57. Schuck, supra note 1, at 76.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1150, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1978). This 1978 amendment was adopted
in the House, .but was ultimately rejected by the House-Senate Conference Committee.
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reasonable nor overly strict to require that a statutory objective be expressly stated if it is to be used to justify administratively imposed age
distinctions.
'Reasonable Factors Other Than Age" Exception
The third exception to the ADA provides that action otherwise
prohibited by the Act is permissible "if, in the program or activity involved,. . . the differentiation made by such action is based upon reasonable factors other than age." 5 9 The legislative history of this
exception, though not utterly silent, is indeed sparse. The House Conference Report on the House bill mentions the exception in its general
discussion of age discrimination:
The provisions in the House bill relating to age discrimination
were modeled on title VI of the Civil Rihts Act of 1964 . . . but
with a significant difference. Distinguishing among individuals on
the basis of race for purposes of determining their eligibility to receive the benefits of, or participate in, federally-assisted programs is
per se unfair treatment and volative [sic] of the Constitution; in this
context, race is an arbitrary distinction. But age may often be a reasonable distinction for these purposes, indeed, the prohibition against
age discrimination contained in the House bill excluded cases where
age is "a factor necessary to the normal operation of such [federallyassisted] program or activity," or where the "differentiation * * * is
based upon reasonablefactorsother than age," or where the program
or activity in question "provides any benefits or assistance to persons
based on the age of such persons."
What the House bill implies in this regard, the conference substitute makes explicit. The purpose of the title is stated to be the
prohibition of unreasonable [emphasis in original] age discrimination
in federally-assisted programs and activities. The actual prohibitory
language of section 303 that is central to this title is modified by considerations of reasonableness, as the exclusions quotedin thepreceding
paragraphsmake clear...
The difficulty, obviously, lies in establishing what age-related
distinctions are "reasonable" with respect to each federally-assisted
program or activity, and on this there is not a clear consensus among
the conferees.60
The obvious difficulty of which the Conference Committee spoke
in establishing "what age-related distinctions are 'reasonable"' was
never resolved by Congress. However, the above language, indicative
of legislative intent, must now be interpreted in light of the 1978
amendments to the ADA. As previously stated, 6' these amendments
59. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1) (1976).
60. H.R. REP. No. 670, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1975) (emphasis added).
61. See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.
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restated the purpose of the Act by excluding the word "unreasonable,"
so that the Act now unequivocally prohibits "discrimination on the ba'62
sis of age."
The apparent consequence o'f the restatement of the purpose of the
ADA is to narrow the ambit of permissible activities deleteriously affecting age groups. Thus, the scope of what constitutes a "reasonable
factor other than age" under the Act's exception is concomitantly narrowed. That this result is in accordance with congressional intent may
be demonstrated by examining the House version of the 1978 amendments to section 304(b)(1) of the ADA.
The proposed House amendment entirely deleted the "reasonable
factors other than age" exception from the Act. In its stead, the House
submitted the following:
It shall not be a violation of this title, or any regulation issued under
this title, for any person to take any action otherwise prohibited by
section 303 if, in the program or activity involved, such action is
taken to remove barriers to participation
in such program or activity
by persons of a particular age. 63
Thus, the intent of the House was clear-the ADA was to allow classifications based on, or implicating, age distinctions if such classifications
were necessary to secure the participation of persons of a particular age
in the program or activity involved.
The fact that the House amendment was not adopted does not
foreclose the interpretation that the exceptions to the Act should be
construed narrowly and made applicable to remedial conduct. Under
this reading of the exception, Schuck's fears that a narrow construction
"would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes
.64 would be dissipated. A narrow construction would not,
as
Schuck asserts, eliminate the use of factors having differential age-specific impacts but rather would allow such use to eliminate existing discrimination, while ensuring careful scrutiny of the use of such factors in
non-remedial contexts. Such a construction totally comports with the
purpose and intent of the Act.
Government-wide regulations under the ADA support the argument that the exception is to be construed as suggested. Though the
statute provides an exception for "reasonable factors other than age,"
the HEW and other regulations require that the non-age factor must
62. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1976).
63. H.R. REP. No. 1150, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1978).
64. Schuck, supra note 1, at 79 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976)).
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bear a "direct and substantial relationship" to the normal operation of
65
a program or activity or to the achievement of a statutory objective.
Contrary to Schuck's view, the standard exacted by the regulations
does not contradict the statute, but rather supplements it. Since Congress failed to define "reasonable," the regulators were left to formulate
their own standards.
In explaining its choice of the "direct and substantial relationship"
standard, HEW asserted:
The regulations adopt the "direct and substantial" standard because it provides the appropriate flexibility and, at the same time,
avoids the weaknesses inherent in the "rational" standard. Use of
the "direct and substantial" standard means that use of factors other
than age must be carefully examined in light of the individual facts
and circumstances surrounding their use. This examination will determine whether the use of the factor other than age is a sufficiently
effective method of achieving a worthwhile program purpose to justify limiting or denying services or participation to adversely affect
persons.6
The direct and substantial
relationship requires use of a standard of careful review and examination of uses of factors other than age on a case-by-case basis.
To use a rational relationship or minimum scrutiny standard
would leave open the possibility of purposefully circumventing the
ADA by allowing administrators to use factors other than age to op67
erate a program when an explicit use of age would be prohibited.
As is true with all provisions of the Age Discrimination Act, there
is a dearth of cases interpreting the reasonable factors other than age
provision. In NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center,6 8 the court reviewed the legality of a plan to relocate a major portion of the Wilmington Medical Center from its urban to a suburban location.
Plaintiff alleged that the relocation violated the Age Discrimination
Act. Reviewing the Act, the court found it to be substantially different
from other civil rights statutes because of the breadth of its exceptions.
It concluded that the non-age related factor exception justified defendant's action even in the face of a less discriminatory feasible alternative:
[W]here the defendant actually adduces some evidence showing that
he based his action upon a non-age-related factor that meets the criteria set out in the act and the regulations, he need not also adduce
evidence showing that his action was the least discriminatory alterna65.
66.
67.
68.

45 C.F.R. § 90.15 (1980).
44 Fed. Reg. 33,774 (1979).
Id. at 33,783 (comment analysis to 45 C.F.R. § 90.15).
491 F. Supp. 290 (D. DeL 1980).
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tive. This interpretation is in accord with the Congressional intent to
apply a lesser degree of scrutiny to actions resulting in age discrimiinnation than to those resulting in racial discrimination. Congress
69
tended only to prohibit "unreasonable age discrimination."
One would hope the strength of the decision would be somewhat
weakened by the fact that the word unreasonable on which the court
appeared to place such great reliance had been removed by the 1978
amendment, a fact of which the court took no cognizance.
Fundamentally, the court is correct in noting that Congress has
distinguished the Age Discrimination Act from other discrimination
legislation. As suggested, it is possible to interpret the exceptions in a
way that limits their harm. Congress probably did not intend them to
be as harmful as Professor Schuck suggests they might be. It is an inescapable truth, however, that Congress allowed itself to resolve competing policy claims by obfuscating important issues. Ultimately, the
elderly must look to Congress to remedy the problem it has created.
That was done with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. It
must also be done with the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.

69. Id. at 317.

